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PROCEDURE FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS—STANDARD 
FOR OBTAINING A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN A 
STATUTORY ENFORCEMENT ACTION  
 
 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from the First Judicial District Court’s denial of a preliminary injunction 
brought by Office of Attorney General, Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP) against a 
telecommunications provider for allegedly engaging in deceptive trade practices due to 
procedural deficiencies in the pleadings supporting the motion. 
 
   Disposition 
 
 Affirmed on different grounds. The BCP did not have any factual support for the 
preliminary injunction in the record. BCP’s motion was defective because they failed to 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the statutory conditions authorizing injunctive 
relief exist. However, BCP could amend its pleadings and filing a new motion for 
injunctive relief. BCP was not required to show irreparable injury or inadequate legal 
remedy to obtain injunctive relief. 
 
 Factual and Procedural History 
 
  Based on numerous customer complaints filed against telecommunications 
providers NOS Communications Inc. and Affinity Networks Inc. (collectively, NOS) the 
BCP determined that NOS was engaging in deceptive trade practices in violation of NRS 
598.0963(3).2 However, before the BCP could file an enforcement action pursuant to 
NRS 589.0963, NOS filed a preemptive complaint for declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief against the BCP. NOS sought a declaration that it was not engaging in 
deceptive trade practices. 
 After filing an answer, but before filing its own claim or a counterclaim, the BCP 
filed a motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to NRS 589.0693 for allegedly 
engaging in deceptive trade practices. Judge Michael R. Griffin of the First Judicial 
District Court denied BCP’s preliminary injunction motion holding that a preexisting 
Nevada Public Utility Commission rulemaking workshop was an adequate remedy at law. 
                                                 
1 By Christopher W. Carson 
2 NRS 598.0963(3) (2004) provides that: 
[W]hen the attorney general has reason to believe that a person has engaged in 
or is engaging in a deceptive trade practice, the attorney general may bring an 
action in the name of the State of Nevada against that person to obtain a 
temporary restraining order, a preliminary or permanent injunction, or other 
appropriate relief. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
 Upon appeal the Nevada Supreme Court first recognized that the district court has 
discretion in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction.3 The court also cited 
case law that supports a reversal of a denial of a preliminary injunction only where the 
district court abused its discretion or based its decision on an erroneous legal standard or 
on clearly erroneous findings of fact.4 
 The court held that the district court was correct in not issuing the preliminary 
injunction, but did so not based on the district court’s holding but rather procedural 
deficiencies in the BCP’s motion.5 Under Hotel Riviera, Inc. v. Torres,6 the court could 
have upheld the district court’s ruling, even if it reached the wrong grounds, so long as it 
reached correct result. However, the court went further to address the merits of the 
district court’s ruling to clarify the jurisprudence in this area. 
 The court agreed with BCP’s argument that Nevada Real Estate Commission v. 
Ressel7 supports the presumption of irreparable injury in a statutory enforcement action. 
NOS argued that the traditional standard of requiring a showing of irreparable injury 
before issuing injunctive relief was the proper remedy.  
In Ressel, the court held that proof of irreparable harm was not needed since the 
state’s policy was declared by statute. By allowing a government agency to seek 
injunctive relief, the sole conditions for the issuance of such an injunction are those set 
out in the act itself.8 
 The court went on to support its holding by looking to other jurisdictions that do 
not require a showing of irreparable harm in statutory enforcement actions before a 
preliminary junction will issue.9 For example, in Ackerman v. Tri-City Geriatric & 
Health Care10 the court concluded that a statutory action granting a government agent the 
right to sue for injunctive relief is wholly different than equitable action for injunctive 
relief.11 
  
                                                 
3 Nevada Escrow Service, Inc. v. Crockett, 91 Nev. 201, 202-03 (1975). 
4 U.S. v. Nutri-cology, Inc., 982 F.2d 394, 397 (9th Cir. 1992). 
5 Because the BCP did not assert a affirmative claim for injunctive relief in its answer or through a 
counterclaim and attached no affidavits containing admissible statements or admissible documents to the 
motion the motion for preliminary injunction was procedurally defective. 
6 97 Nev. 399, 403 (1981). 
7 72 Nev. 79 (1956) 
8 Id. at 80-81. 
9 See U.S. v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (noting the difference between the 
standard needed for granting an injunction when a governmental entity is involved as opposed to two 
private litigants) see also Vill. Of Riverdale v. Allied Waste Transp., 334 Ill.App.3d 224, 267 (2002) 
(presuming harm to the public at large from statutory violation enough to support granting of injunction). 
10 55 N.E.2d 145 (Ohio 1978) 
11 Id. at 148-49. 
The court held that the district court went too far in holding that the utility commission 
workshop was an adequate remedy at law. The court held that once the governmental 
agency makes a showing of admissible evidence of a statutory violation (here a deceptive 
trade practice) the injunction should issue. Because the BCP failed to adequately support 
its motion for the preliminary injunction the district court was correct in denying it. 
 
Conclusion 
  
While the outcome in this case remains the same, the court essentially grants for 
the appellants in this matter. By establishing that irreparable harm is presumed when a 
preliminary injunction occurs in a statutory enforcement action, the court practically 
invites the BCP to amend its motion and file a new injunction. As long as the BCP can 
present any admissible evidence showing a deceptive trade practice the injunction will 
automatically issue and preclude NOS from engaging in the alleged deceptive trade 
practices. 
  
 
